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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the last several years, the People’s Republic of China, under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, has launched two interrelated campaigns which
pose a novel problem for the international legal system. The first of these
campaigns is an ambitious endeavor aimed at increasing China’s influence
internationally.1 The second is a domestic effort aimed at stifling dissent and
cementing the governing Chinese Communist Party’s control over its citizenry.2 In the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (hereafter Xinjiang),
these two campaigns intersect in such a way as to pose a new and weighty
problem for the international system of human rights, namely, how can the
international system respond when a nation undertakes to forcibly destroy a
minority culture without resorting to forced migration or mass murder?
Xinjiang is China’s northwest-most region and is home to the Uyghurs
(also spelled Uighurs), an ethnically Turkic people who practice Islam and are
culturally, ethnically, and linguistically distinct from China’s Han majority.3
The Communist government has made the elimination of Uyghur culture, and
its replacement with an iteration of Han-Chinese culture more in line with the
Party’s sensibilities, part of its domestic agenda for the region.4 This effort at
sinicizing the Uyghur people makes use of an expanding system of reeducation camps accompanied by an extremely sophisticated and nigh-omniscient
surveillance apparatus.5 Estimates vary as to how many people have been sent
into these camps, but they range from several hundred thousand to over a million.6 This campaign includes numerous violations of both Chinese domestic
law and international agreements to which China is a party.
1
Is China Challenging the United States for Global Leadership?, ECONOMIST (Apr. 1,
2017), https://www.economist.com/china/2017/04/01/is-china-challenging-the-united-stat
es-for-global-leadership.
2
See Tom Phillips, Chairman Xi Crushes Dissent but Poor Believe he’s Making China
Great, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 14, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/world/ 2017/oct/14/
xi-jinping-crushes-dissent-but-making-china-great-again.
3
Matthew Moneyhon, Controlling Xinjiang: Autonomy on China’s “New Frontier”, 3
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 120, 120-122 (2002); Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, Silencing the
Silk Road: China’s Language Policy in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region, 11 SAN DIEGO
INT’L L. J. 135, 138-39 (2009).
4
Ann Scott Tyson, Xinjiang: Beijing’s Chilling Attempt to Erase and Replace Uyghur
Identity, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.csmonitor.com/World/AsiaPacific/2019/0107/Xinjiang-Beijing-s-chilling-attempt-to-erase-and-replace-Uyghur-iden
tity.
5
China Has Turned Xinjiang Into a Police State Like No Other, THE ECONOMIST (May
31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/05/31/china-has-turned-xinjiang-int
o-a-police-state-like-no-other [hereinafter Like No Other].
6
Editorial, China’s Repugnant Campaign to Destroy a Minority People, WASH. POST
(May 20, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/chinas-repugnant-campaign-t
o-destroy-a-minority-people/2018/05/20/9fe061b4-5ac0-11e8-b656a5f8c2a9295d_story.h
tml.
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This Note aims to analyze the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang
in the context of international law as it applies to China. It proceeds in three
parts. Part I introduces the relevant historic background. Part II will discuss
relevant facts, including the historical context of the campaign, the various
cultural-political interests at play in Xinjiang, and the process by which the
Chinese government suppresses the Uyghur people. Part III will begin by discussing two of the international agreements violated by the Chinese government’s campaign against the Uyghurs in Xinjiang and end with an examination of key Chinese laws. Part IV will first examine the Chinese government’s
failure to meet its obligations under the aforementioned international agreements then examine the extent to which China’s domestic laws contribute to
the present situation in Xinjiang. This Note concludes that the People’s Republic of China is in violation of its treaty obligations and that the Chinese
legal system has not only allowed, but enabled, these violations.
II. CHINA’S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE UYGHURS IN CONTEXT
The Xi Administration’s campaign against the Uyghurs takes place against
a complicated backdrop of historic and socio-political tensions. Historically,
Northwest China, and Xinjiang in particular, is a very different place from
China’s political power centers along its East Coast, and Han Chinese iterations of nationalism predate even Mao Zedong’s Communist Revolution.7 The
situation is complicated by the fact that Xinjiang has been made into the
world’s largest police state.8 This part of the Note first provides the necessary
historical background to the situation in Xinjiang. It will then explore the various cultural and political interests at play. After the necessary context is provided, this part will discuss the campaign itself.
A. History of Xinjiang: Before, Under, and After Mao
Xinjiang has a long, complicated relationship with the Chinese interior,9
and the Communist Party has made incorporating Chinese national identity in
more isolated regions like Xinjiang a priority.10 Understanding the current
plight of the Uyghurs requires some understanding of this history and how the
relationship between the Uyghurs and the Chinese government has developed
over time. More specifically, a historical understanding requires an

7
Rian Thum, The Uyghurs in Modern China, in OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
ASIAN HISTORY (Apr. 26, 2018), http://asianhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9
780190277727.001.0001/acrefore-9780190277727-e-160; Like No Other, supra note 5.
8
See Like No Other, supra note 5.
9
Thum, supra note 7.
10
Moneyhon, supra note 3, at 131.

2019]

SILENCING XINJIANG

237

appreciation of Xinjiang’s history prior to the Communist Revolution, under
Mao, and in the Post-Mao Era.
i.

Xinjiang from the Early to Mid-Twentieth Century

The history of Xinjiang prior to Mao Zedong’s Communist Revolution is
complicated, and to this date there are still disagreements of fact between Uyghur historians and the Chinese government.11 What is Xinjiang today has, at
various times, been ruled by larger Chinese states, divided into smaller states,
ruled as an independent region, and partially unified as a series of independent
republics under various names, most notably the First East Turkestan Republic.12 This tumultuous history of varying different governments, revolution,
and outside influence is largely reflected in the social tensions rife in Xinjiang
today.
At the start of the twentieth century, Xinjiang was a part of the Qing Empire, which was, at the time, still struggling to integrate the region with the
rest of China.13 Due to a combination of factors, including the efforts to integrate Xinjiang with the rest of China and the emergent Uyghur nationalism
movements toward regional autonomy, the collapse of the Qing Empire did
not change the political makeup of the region; former Qing officials stepped
in to rule the region even as the Qing Empire disintegrated into a number of
successor states.14 In the following decades, various entities competed for
power and influence in Xinjiang including the Soviet Union, outside Muslim
armies, the Chinese Nationalist government, and Uyghur nationalists who
sought to unite various Turkic groups in the region under a unified Uyghur
identity.15 This competition resulted in a chaotic period which saw the creation of two different East Turkistan Republics, multiple Soviet interventions,
and a rise in Uyghur nationalist sentiment.16 In spite of the chaos, the Chinese
Communist Party emerged victorious when the portions of the region controlled by the Nationalists surrendered to Communist forces bloodlessly, and
the last vestiges of the East Turkestan Republic agreed to be absorbed into the
People’s Republic of China.17

11
Elena Caprioni, Daily Encounters Between Hans and Uyghurs in Xinjiang: Sinicization, Integration, or Segregation?, 84 PAC. AFF. 267, 268 (2011).
12
Thum, supra note 7.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
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Xinjiang Under Mao

Mao declared the birth of the People’s Republic of China in October 1949,
and his approach to Xinjiang initially involved a relatively light touch.18 A
migration program brought many Han Chinese into the region.19 The Islamic
Court system was disassembled,20 and the new Communist government seized
and redistributed land.21 Although these would normally be considered massive reforms, when compared with Mao’s subsequent programs, these policies
were mild.
Mao’s Great Leap Forward and Anti-Rightist Campaigns, both of which
began in the late 1950s, brought sweeping change to Xinjiang, with disastrous
consequences.22 Forced collectivization ravaged the Chinese farm economy
and radically reshaped socioeconomic institutions, all while new settlers and
refugees resettled in the region.23 The Communist government began stifling
religious practice early on, but it was during these campaigns that such persecutions and likely related unrest began to affect Xinjiang. 24 Communist officials shuttered Islamic schools, took mosques to serve as their offices, and
destroyed religious texts.25 Forced social reforms upended the social structure
in Xinjiang to such an extent that public religious expression was nearly impossible.26 Simultaneously, the Anti-Rightist Campaign purged over one
thousand Uyghur officials.27 Han Chinese Communists were placed in positions of authority, and the local economy and regional security forces were
placed under their control.28 During the Cultural Revolution, Han Communists took control of every aspect of life in Xinjiang. They dismantled Uyghur social institutions, took control of the local economy, and established a
firm grip on power in the region.29 Even though many Uyghurs, likely fueled
by religious grievances, pushed back against Mao’s policies,30 the great

18

Id.
Michael Dillon, Muslim Communities in Contemporary China: The Resurgence of
Islam After the Cultural Revolution, 5 J. ISLAMIC STUD. 70, 82 (1994).
20
Thum, supra note 7.
21
Dillon, supra note 19, at 82.
22
Thum, supra note 7.
23
Id.
24
Yitzhak Shichor, Blow Up: Internal and External Challenges of Uyghur Separatism
and Islamic Radicalism to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang, 32 ASIAN AFFAIRS: AN AM. REV. 119,
127 (2005).
25
Thum, supra note 7.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
See Dillon, supra note 19, at 82.
29
Id.
30
Shichor, supra note 24, at 127.
19
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campaigns of the Mao era were largely successful in repressing Uyghur religious and cultural practices.31
iii.

Xinjiang from Deng to Xi

The post-Mao era in Xinjiang saw a resurgence of Uyghur nationalism as
well as the emergence of a new problem in the region: Islamic extremism.
Deng Xiaoping took power after Mao’s death, and his efforts toward a more
open China were reflected in Xinjiang where there was a rapid restoration of
Uyghur cultural identity.32 However, in the face of concerns about renewing
Uyghur nationalist movements, reformist policies were quickly abandoned.33
These nationalists were motivated in part by Beijing’s continued push to encourage Han immigration to Xinjiang which Uyghur nationalists perceived as
a strategy to dilute local culture and ensure Han control of the region.34 Tensions continued to mount after once-peaceful protests became violent.35 Assimilationist policies fueled rising Islamic radicalism which took root in the
region and elevated tensions even further.36 Thousands of Uyghurs, now allowed to freely travel to Mecca for the Hajj, returned with fundamentalist literature and videocassettes.37 Several Uyghur nationalist groups, labelled terrorists by the Chinese government, incorporated Islamic fundamentalism into
their messages.38 One group even called for a holy war against the Han and
their perceived backers in Beijing.39
Though few Uyghurs have taken the radical steps called for by some of the
most extreme groups in Xinjiang, terrorism has nevertheless become a defining issue in the Xi administration’s approach to Xinjiang. Riots struck Xinjiang’s capital, Urumqi, in 2009 and left nearly 200 dead and over 1,000 injured.40 Outbursts of violence have plagued the region, leading the Xi
administration to wage what China’s state media has called its own “war on
terror” against the perceived Uyghur threat.41 As this note will show, the
31

Thum, supra note 7.
Id.
33
See Dillon, supra note 19, at 83.
34
Id. at 84.
35
Thum, supra note 7.
36
Shichor, supra note 24, at 122; Dana Carver Boehm, China’s Failed War on Terror:
Fanning the Flames of Uighur Separatist Violence, 2 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC
L. 61, 83-84 (2009).
37
Shichor, supra note 24, at 122.
38
Id. at 122-23.
39
Id. at 123.
40
Reza Hasmath, What Explains the Rise of Majority-Minority Tensions and Conflict in
Xinjiang?, 38 CENTRAL ASIAN SURV. 46, 46 (2018).
41
Phillip Wen, Terror Threats Transform China’s Uighur Heartland into Security State,
REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-xinjiang-security-ins
32
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government’s actions in this “war” have significant implications in international law and beyond.
B. Tensions: Cultural and Political Interests at Play in Xinjiang
The two primary actors in Xinjiang’s present situation are the region’s Uyghur population and the Chinese government. The Communist Party’s policy
toward Xinjiang centers on an effort to sinicize the region and the Uyghurs
who live there and, in doing so, bring them more into line with the Communist
Party’s vision of a more unified China.42 This policy has been in place for
some time, and has led to an exacerbation of tension in the region,43 culminating in the campaign against the Uyghurs in place today. Uyghur interests have
clashed with the government’s agenda. Under President Xi, the government
has used this clash, and the conflicts therein to justify its actions in Xinjiang.
Understanding the campaign itself requires one to examine both Uyghur interests in the region and the government’s agenda, as well as the Xi Administration’s underlying justification for the campaign.
i.

Uyghur Interests in Xinjiang

While Xinjiang is the traditional homeland of the Uyghur people, prior to
the last century, few in Xinjiang would have identified with the term “Uyghur.”44 In fact, Uyghur identity is a relatively new cultural phenomenon, one
that began only in the early twentieth century.45 During this time period, many
Uyghur writers and politicians began to explore their Islamic heritage as well
as a shared, ethnonational sense of self, and Uyghur identity spread from
there.46 This identity was shaped by two key components: Islam and Uyghur
autonomy.
Like most Turkic peoples, almost all Uyghurs practice Islam.47 For much
of Uyghur history, Islam has been a part of daily life and has shaped Uyghur
culture.48 By contrast, the Communist Party remains a staunchly atheistic

ight/terror-threats-transform-chinas-uighur-heartland-into-security-state idUSKBN173A
S.
42
Liu Caiyu, Islamic Communities Urged to Uphold Sinicization, Improve Political
Stance, GLOBAL TIMES (Jan. 6, 2018), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1134757.shtml
(note that GLOBAL TIMES is owned by the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Committee).
43
Id.; Boehm, supra note 36.
44
Thum, supra note 7.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Dillon, supra note 19 (explaining the influence of Islam on the Uyghurs).
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organization.49 Following Deng’s rise to power and the subsequent easing of
many of the Communist Party’s more repressive policies, Islam in China experienced something of a renaissance.50 Religion returned to prominence in
the region, and assumed many of its previous functions in Uyghur society.51
Under President Xi, however, the government’s approach to Islam has swung
back toward repression.52
Of equal importance to Islam’s role in Uyghur identity is the idea of Uyghur autonomy. The Chinese government designates Xinjiang an autonomous
region, which should in theory grant it some measure of self-rule, but this is
still a far cry from the self-governance that the Uyghurs have held at various
times throughout history.53 There is some evidence to suggest that many Uyghurs today view Chinese rule in the region as illegitimate.54 China has responded by cracking down on separatist sentiment, but in the past, crackdowns have led to further calls for independence.55 Calls for separatism are
voiced internationally by a growing number of Uyghur diaspora organizations
as well.56
ii.

Beijing’s Agenda for Xinjiang

The current situation in Xinjiang is part of a broader agenda by President
Xi which seeks to recentralize and cement power in the hands of the Communist Party while projecting a powerful image of unity and strength both
domestically and abroad.57 The policy of objectives entailed in this broader
agenda have large implications in Xinjiang as well. Appreciating how this
agenda has sharpened the government’s actions in Xinjiang requires one to
examine the intersection of traditional Han culture and communism, the nature of Chinese governance, and the agenda itself.
Over the last several decades, the Chinese Communist Party has effectively replaced many aspects of what one might call traditional Han culture

49

Hasmath, supra note 40, at 46.
Dillon supra note 19, at 71.
51
Id.
52
Thum, supra note 7.
53
Id.; Moneyhon, supra note 3, at 126, 136.
54
Id.
55
Boehm, supra note 36, at 66.
56
Shichor, supra note 24, at 126.
57
Banyan, Can Xi Jinping Make Use of the Power he has Accumulated?, ECONOMIST
(Mar. 31, 2018), https://www.economist.com/china/2018/03/31/can-xi-jinpin
g-make-use-of-the-power-he-has-accumulated; Editorial, China’s President Just Laid Out
a Worrying Vision for the World, WASH. POST (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.washingtonpos
t.com/opinions/global-opinions/xi-jinpings-ambitions-ought-to-concern-the-worlds-demo
cratic-nations/2017/10/18/53c8c9d8-b41c-11e7-a90a3470754bbb9_story.html.
50

242

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:233

with its values.58 Despite the West’s perception of Chinese culture as being
ancient and spread throughout China, the idea of a China unified by Han culture is relatively modern, dating to the end of Qing rule (in the early twentieth
century).59 By incorporating Chinese myth with ethnonationalist rhetoric, the
idea of a Han ethnicity gained significant traction early on.60 Chinese intellectuals, inspired in part by Western conceptions of ethnicity, endeavored to
unify China under the umbrella of Han ethnicity.61 During the Cultural Revolution, however, the Communist Party denounced what it called “Han chauvinisim [sic]”62 and sought to destroy many elements of traditional Chinese
culture.63 However, after Mao’s death, the Communist Party embraced and
co-opted Han nationalism as a way to maintain political legitimacy as it pivoted away from Mao’s immensely destructive policies.64 Deng Xiaoping and
his successors combined Han nationalism with Maoist rhetoric and remade
the Party’s image from top to bottom, paying rhetorical lip service to Marxist
thought while adopting a more pragmatic system under the guise of Han ethnic identity.65 Xi Jinping has taken this one step further by using Han ethnonationalist arguments to take an expansive view of Chinese sovereignty.66
China’s governing structure renders it effectively a one-party state in
which the Communist Party, which includes about 70% of its legislature’s
delegates and almost all of the government’s senior officials, exerts almost
total control over the government.67 Policy formulated by those at the very top
of the Communist Party who serve on the Politburo and is then approved by
the National People’s Congress.68 The Politburo is elected by the Communist
Party’s Central Committee, which is controlled by Xi Jinping, who, in addition to his role as President, serves as the Communist Party’s General Secretary.69 In recent years Xi has consolidated authority even further, launching an
anti-corruption campaign which he has used to remove potential rivals and
58
Hayden Windrow, From State to Nation: The Forging of the Han through Language
Policy in the PRC and Taiwan, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 373, 397-98 (2005).
59
Id. at 382-83.
60
Id. at 385-86.
61
Id. at 384.
62
Thum, supra note 7.
63
Windrow, supra note 58, at 397.
64
John M. Friend & Bradley A. Thayer, The Rise of Han-Centrism and What It Means
65
Windrow, supra note 58, at 399-400.
66
Id.; Boehm, supra note 36, at 77.
67
National People’s Congress, BBC: How China is Ruled, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/sha
red/spl/hi/in_depth/china_politics/government/html/7.stm (last visited Sept. 24, 2019).
68
Id.
69
Politburo, BBC: How China is Ruled, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/in_depth
/china_politics/government/html/4.stm (last visited Sept. 24, 2019); Li Xia, Xi Focus: Xi
Requires Deepening CPC’s Self-Reform, XINHUANET (June 25, 2019), http://www.xinhuan
et.com/english/2019-06/25/c_13817 3020.htm (note that Xinhua is the official state-run
press agency of the PRC, subordinate to the Chinese government).

2019]

SILENCING XINJIANG

243

install loyalists in high ranking positions.70 He has also created new bureaucratic agencies to continue this mission outside of the halls of power with the
express goal of cementing the Communist Party’s grip on power for years to
come. 71 In both name and function, therefore, Xi Jinping wields more authority than any one person in the Communist Party since Mao Zedong.
The agenda President Xi has pursued is reflected in his policies and rhetoric. His government has taken great care in crafting an agenda aimed at recentralizing power in the hands of the Communist Party.72 He has used populist
appeals in rallying support for an expansive view of Chinese territorial sovereignty internationally.73 Domestically, his government has cracked down on
dissidents and made extensive use of nationalistic rhetoric to sell his “China
Dream” to the Chinese people.74 This rhetoric is backed by assimilationist
policies in Xinjiang.75 The chauvinistic policies eschewed by the Communist
Party’s founder have become part of a national agenda aimed at sinicizing
minority ethnicities.
iii.

Justifying the Campaign

In contrast to the relatively complex interplay of ideas forming the foundation of the Xi administration’s national agenda, the justification for the campaign against the Uyghurs is relatively simple. The Global Times, which is
owned by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, has written that policies in the region “have given priority to anti-secession and counter-terrorism so as to maintain stable development, and Western media should
see the situation themselves before accusing China.”76 The Communist Party
of China’s news agency has also attributed the following statement regarding
the reasons for what it calls a “vocational education and training program”
(the government’s preferred term for its internment camps) to Xinjiang official Shohrat Zakir: “The move aims to prevent the majority of those who committed petty crimes from becoming victims of terrorism and extremism.”77
70

Banyan, supra note 57.
Id.
72
Id.
73
See Editorial, supra note 57.
74
Friend & Thayer, supra note 64.
75
Mark D. Kielsgard & Tam Hey Juan Julian, The Second Front – Again? The Rising
Tide of Global Jihadism in East and Southeast Asia, 13 INTERCULTURAL HUM. RTS. L. REV.
131, 162 (2018).
76
Liu Xin, Xinjiang Policies Justified, GLOBAL TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), http://www.glob
altimes.cn/content/1115202.shtml (note that this statement is attributed to “Chinese experts” without the use of quotations).
77
Liu Caiyu, Xinjiang Stability on the Rise, GLOBAL TIMES (Oct. 16, 2018),
http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1123155.shtml (note that this statement is attributed
without the use of quotations).
71
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Claims of a terrorist threat in Xinjiang are not unfounded, but should be
treated with skepticism. The Chinese government often restricts access to information when it has the potential to reflect poorly on its agenda, but bombings have occurred in Xinjiang, a series of which took place in 1992 targeting
buses and more attacks on January 22, 2005 which killed thirteen people.78 A
terrorist organization calling itself the Organization for Turkestan Freedom
claimed responsibility for a Beijing bus bombing in 1997.79 While credible,
precise data on the number of attacks and the number of casualties inflicted is
unavailable, there is ample evidence to support the claim that separatist and
extremist terrorism has been a problem in Xinjiang in the past.80 However,
other clashes between Uyghurs and the Han government in Xinjiang reveal
another side to this narrative. In February 1997, hundreds of Uyghur protestors marched in the streets demanding the release of imprisoned clerics and
better employment opportunities.81 After their violent dispersal by police, approximately 300 were rounded up and summarily executed, though official
reports number the total deaths at nine.82
Examination of how the Communist Party’s media apparatus has approached the threat of separatism and extremism underscores a connection
between the government’s agenda in Xinjiang and the harsh measures used to
implement it. The threat of terrorist activity in Xinjiang, while certainly a real
issue, is being used as justification for an overwhelming government response. The Global Times echoes this justification with statements such as:
“Authorities in Hami, Northwest China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, urged suspects of violence and terrorism and those influenced by the
three evil forces of separatism, extremism and terrorism to surrender within
30 days for leniency.”83 Using these “three evil forces” as justification has
become an integral part of a campaign that goes well beyond merely combatting extremist activities.
C. The Campaign Against the Uyghurs
The broader agenda in Xinjiang is pursued through a campaign unlike anything that has come before it. In years past, most attempts at purging a
78

Boehm, supra note 36, at 108, 110.
Id. at 106, 110.
80
Enshen Li, China’s New Counterterrorism Legal Framework in the Post-2001 Era:
Legal Development, Penal Change, and Political Legitimacy, 19 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 344,
346 (2016); Justine Drennan, Is China Making Its Own Terrorsim Problem Worse?¸
FOREIGN POL’Y (Feb. 9, 2015), https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/09/is-china-making-its
-own-terrorism-problem-worse-uighurs-islamic-state/.
81
Boehm, supra note 36, at 65, 109 n.280.
82
Id.
83
Zhang Hui, Xinjiang City Urges Terrorists to Turn Themselves in Within 30 Days,
GLOBAL TIMES (Nov. 19, 2018), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1128030.shtml.
79
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perceived dissident population were made by either forcibly removing them
from the country, murdering members of the group en masse, or some combination of the two.84 The Xi administration’s (and by extension the Communist
Party’s) agenda for Xinjiang seeks to accomplish the same basic goal of removing dissidents and potential dissidents belonging to an ethnic group without the international condemnation and internal strife involved in forced migration and genocide. The result is what a sort of genocide of the mind
wherein the perceived source of the dissidence, here Uyghur culture, is eliminated via forced indoctrination into another culture, in this case the Communist Party’s iteration of Han ethnonationalism. In Xinjiang this effort has
three key components. The first is a vast surveillance network which combines a large and extremely active police presence with cutting edge technology designed to monitor the populace at all times. The second is the da fa,
meaning “strike hard,” campaign which arrests dissidents and anyone with
even a remote connection to dissident activity. The third is the internment
camps themselves which forcibly re-educate those arrested.
i.

A Dragnet Like No Other: The Xinjiang Surveillance State

The campaign against the Uyghurs makes use of a vast surveillance network unlike anything that has existed before it. Xinjiang and its capital,
Urumqi, have been made what has been called a twenty-first century police
state85 and the world’s most heavily guarded place.86 Indeed if one defines a
“police state” as a state in which a repressive government uses police force to
control all aspects of life,87 it can be argued that there is no better modern
example than Xinjiang today. In building a sophisticated police state of this
size and scope, the Chinese government has combined more traditional policing tactics like roadblocks and checkpoints with an extremely sophisticated
surveillance apparatus which makes use of cutting-edge technology to constantly monitor the populace.
Even without the use of technology, Xinjiang might still be considered one
of the most tightly monitored areas in the world. Police are almost everywhere
in the region, particularly in more urban areas, where many shop assistants
84
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have joined the police force to meet the requirement that all shops and restaurants have a part-time officer on duty.88 In some cities, there are police checkpoints virtually everywhere, with as many as four or five every kilometer.89
Police regularly take fingerprints and blood samples, and use paper forms to
collect personal information from Uyghurs.90 Roving, six-person teams of police and local officials go door to door “compiling dossiers of personal information.”91 Among the information Xinjiang’s residents are required to disclose is their religious faith along with where and how often they worship.92
Police also require residents to disclose any foreign contacts, their relationship
to those contacts, and whether they have any relatives who have been detained.93 Additionally, travel for Uyghurs has been made almost impossible
because in addition to having to leave their passports with local public safety
bureaus, many have found it difficult to book hotels or buy tickets for rail or
air transportation.94 All of these measures are supplemented by human intelligence as well. Chinese officials have attempted to intimidate Uyghurs living
abroad by threatening family members who remain in the region.95 Some Uyghurs cannot even escape the police presence at home as the government has
created a program in which local families adopt officials, who visit regularly
to teach Mandarin and to verify information given to the police.96 In effect,
police are present nearly at every possible moment in Xinjiang.
The physical police presence in Xinjiang today is pervasive, but what
makes Xinjiang’s surveillance network special is its use of technology.
Though not for lack of effort, police and other officials would not realistically
be able to surveil Xinjiang’s populace at every waking moment without the
aid of perhaps the most technologically sophisticated and pervasive digital
surveillance system anywhere in the world.97 Uyghurs in the region can face
arrest for failing to download smartphone applications that enable authorities
to constantly track their location.98 Police officers carry handsets that can scan
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phones to instantly determine whether the appropriate applications have been
installed.99 At checkpoints, police seize phones and download the phone’s
data for subsequent analysis.100 Even if one does not own a smartphone, the
network is essentially built into government records, so a simple scan of an
identification card or even the use of an iris-recognition program can provide
information as well.101 The Xinjiang surveillance network also includes a
massive DNA database containing tens of millions of samples.102 The surveillance network continually monitors people by using cameras and microphones
equipped with sophisticated facial and vocal recognition software.103 By using
these technologies in conjunction with a massive police presence, government
officials in Xinjiang have created a dragnet surveillance apparatus capable of
constantly monitoring the Xinjiang’s Uyghurs to an extent almost unimaginable in previous decades.
ii.

Da Fa Meaning “Strike Hard”

Surveillance is only part of the reason for the size and scope of police presence in Xinjiang. Police force is also used in implementing the government’s
“strike hard” tactics. As a police tactic, Strike Hard was first implemented as
part of a crackdown on crime across China in Spring 1996.104 Under the leadership of Xinjiang’s new Party Secretary, Chen Quanguo, the renewed campaign in Xinjiang has seen a surge in both the number of personnel involved
and the aggression with which these security forces operate.105 Police conduct
the individual strikes with little regard for discipline, and police have shot
those who refuse to cooperate.106 The raids target Uyghur neighborhoods and
frequently uncover materials of which Beijing does not approve.107 The strikes
99
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also target Uyghur literature, music, religious texts, and the Uyghur language,
and any material teaching these subjects is seized and burned.108
Strike Hard can be seen as both supplementing and being bolstered by the
surveillance network. Arrests can be made through individual strikes against
those found by the surveillance network to espouse politically incorrect beliefs. These arrests can also create reasons for further arrests when someone
is found to be in possession of materials labelled by the government as propagating extremism, so the Strike Hard campaign can cut both ways.
iii.

Xinjiang’s Internment Camps

In terms of achieving Beijing’s agenda in Xinjiang, the surveillance system
and Strike Hard are best seen as tools used to facilitate the process by which
the government exorcises Uyghur culture from its practitioners. The principle
tool by which the Chinese government actually achieves this goal is a growing
array of what the Chinese government euphemistically refers to as “vocational
skill education training centers.”109 It is inside these facilities where the actual
process of re-education occurs.
Some have reported that they were first jailed locally before being transferred to these centers that now dot the region, and at least one man, a citizen
of Kazakhstan who the Chinese government believed was helping some Uyghurs to escape China, was interrogated and tortured extensively before ever
setting foot in a reeducation camp.110 Though the Chinese government has
attempted to shroud much of what it does in these camps in secrecy, a number
of former internees have described the inner workings of these camps despite
threats made by the government against their families.111
Once inside the camps, internees are kept in overcrowded cells with poor
sanitary conditions.112 Their living situation is made worse by restrictions on
bathing and on the religious washing required of practicing Muslims.113 When
not in their cells, their new teachers require them to sing songs praising the
Communist Party or memorize Confucian texts, and they are regularly tested
on their knowledge of Mandarin and on how well they can recite the assigned
108
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Communist propaganda.114 The internees are not simply forced to embrace
Han culture, they are required to denounce their own and repudiate the “three
evil forces.” 115 All internees are required to stand at the front of a group of
their peers while they profess their admiration for the Party and their disdain
for their own religious and cultural practices.116 They are rewarded if they
mirror official lines well or if they criticize others particularly harshly for their
asserted wrongdoings.117 This can be a difficult task, as some internees are
farmers who are there simply for failing to speak Mandarin, a language they
may have never learned.118 Any semblance of religious behavior is banned,
and anyone who fails to comply with this and other rules can be locked in socalled tiger chairs, which restrain arms and legs for a full day.119
Still, what several of those who have spoken about the camps have described as the worst part of the experience is the psychological pressure stemming from the repetitiveness of their “lessons.” For months or potentially
years on end, internees repeat the humiliating process of being forced to denounce and denigrate their own culture while receiving constant political indoctrination.120 The psychological pressure placed on them is enormous, intentional, and aimed directly at eradicating any potentially dissident
thought.121 Their words and actions are closely monitored for even a semblance of politically incorrect behavior, and anyone who violates the rules is
swiftly punished.122 The pressure is so great that multiple internees reported
either having attempted or considered suicide, and while the chief goal does
seem to be indoctrination, most of those who have spoken about their experiences report witnessing brutal beatings at the hands of the security forces that
guard the facility.123 The entire process is designed to sever the connection
between the internees and their culture. One document obtained by journalists
asserted that the camps must “break their lineage, break their roots, break their
connections, and break their origins.”124
Those who have “graduated” (word used in statements from “graduates”
of the camps) are used as forced labor in factories that have been built inside
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the camps.125 The facilities are referred to as “black factories” because they
offer little pay and difficult conditions.126 Details from inside these factories
are as tightly controlled as information from inside the internment camps, and
there is some dispute as to whether the workers are paid at all, but employment
does not appear to be optional.127
III. COVENANTS AND COMMUNISM: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW IN
XINJIANG
International law and Chinese law are both implicated by the policies
China’s government has implemented in Xinjiang. Numerous international
agreements prohibit policies aimed at suppressing ethnic and religious minorities. Of particular relevance to the situation in Xinjiang today are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, both
of which have been ratified by the Chinese government.128 These two agreements both impose affirmative obligations on China’s government, so an
overview of relevant Chinese law is required as well.
A. The 1965 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination
The Racial Discrimination Convention defines racial discrimination as:
[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights
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and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social,
cultural or any other field of public life.129
States parties to the Racial Discrimination Convention are obligated to implement a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all forms.130 In order
to understand this obligation and others in the Convention it is necessary to
appreciate the genesis of the Convention, the relevant obligations under it,
how those obligations are monitored, and the relevant enforcement body’s observations on China’s compliance with the Convention.
i.

To End Racial Discrimination: Relevant Background on the
Racial Discrimination Convention

The influences on the Racial Discrimination Convention are varied and
complicated, and they underscore a general attitude of opposition toward racial discrimination in the international community which has grown stronger
over time.131 Of equal import in assessing Xinjiang under the Racial Discrimination Convention is an understanding of China’s approach to the Convention and the reservations it made when China ratified the Convention in
1981.132
The Racial Discrimination Convention was born of a desire to put an end
to discrimination against nonwhite persons.133 When the United Nations began to seriously consider the issue of continued manifestations of racial hatred
and discrimination in 1960, the idea of an international convention to end racial discrimination had not yet gained serious traction.134 However, the next
year, the Commission on Human Rights’ Sub-Committee on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities suggested that just such an instrument be created.135 Over the course of the next several years, delegates from
various countries debated the idea, with a large number voicing support, but
the issue of whether religious discrimination should be addressed via the same
129
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agreement posed a particular problem for several states, particularly majorityMuslim Arab countries.136 The issue of racial discrimination was then severed
from religious discrimination, meaning that while the Racial Discrimination
Convention does encompass a variety of forms of discrimination distinct from
race, it does not cover religious anti-Semitism or anti-Muslim policies insofar
as they are unrelated to questions of race.137 The Sub-Committee on Discrimination began work in January 1964, and the Convention was quickly adopted
in December of the following year.138 It entered into force in January 1969.139
China’s 1981 ratification of the Racial Discrimination Convention came
with a reservation. China is not bound by Article 22 of the Convention,140
which states that disputes which go unresolved by the procedures in the Convention may be settled by the International Court of Justice, unless otherwise
agreed by the disputant parties.141 China’s reservation simply means that
should there be some dispute with another party, China cannot be forced to
defend its policies in the International Court of Justice because of its obligations under the Racial Discrimination Convention.
ii.

Provisions Relevant to Xinjiang

In addition to a sweeping definition of racial discrimination that includes
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity142 and the imposition of and obligation
to condemn and eliminate such practices, the Racial Discrimination Convention also contains an enumerated list of rights to which citizens are entitled
enjoy equally.143 Of greatest relevance to the Chinese government’s actions
in Xinjiang are the obligation to eliminate racial discrimination contained in
Article 2 and the equal protection of enjoyment with regard to certain rights
enumerated in Article 5.144
Keeping in mind the definition of racial discrimination laid out in Article
1145, any inquiry as to whether a state is complying with its obligations under
the Racial Discrimination Convention requires an assessment of the specific
actions required by the Convention. Article 2 clarifies the obligation to end
racial discrimination as defined in Article 1 by stating: “States Parties
136
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condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate
means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in all its
forms and promoting understanding among all races . . . .”146 States bound by
the convention therefore must “undertake[] to engage in no act or practice of
racial discrimination against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to
ensure that all public authorities and public institutions, national and local,
shall act in conformity with this obligation.”147 Moreover, “Each State Party
shall take effective measures to review governmental, national and local policies, and to amend, rescind or nullify any laws and regulations which have
the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.”148 The Racial Discrimination Convention poses very clear requirements
to directly confront and end all forms of racial discrimination, including those
perpetuated by government bodies, without delay.149
Article 5 is less clear cut, but the obligations it specifies are no less important.150 Its chapeau states:
In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid down in
article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and
to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to
race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the
law, notably in the enjoyment of the following rights . . . .151
The text of the chapeau would seem to indicate that the requirement is
simply equality in enjoyment of those rights, which an illiberal state might
interpret to be met if all groups are equally restricted in, for example, the free
exercise of religion. While it cannot be said that Article 5 establishes a commitment on the part of a state party to guarantee one of the Article 5 rights, it
has been increasingly interpreted to pose its enumerated rights not as being
subsidiary to the right to equal treatment before the law but as requirements
imposed on states parties as part of a necessary framework for measures to
combat racial discrimination as defined in Article 1.152 To put it more simply,
the human rights framework of the Racial Discrimination Convention effectively assumes recognition of the rights enumerated in Article 5.153 Applied to
146

Id. at art. 2, para. 1.
Id. at art. 2, para. 1(a).
148
Id. at art. 2, para. 1(c).
149
Id. at art. 2, para. 1.
150
Id. at art. 5.
151
Id.
152
THORNBERRY, supra note 134, at 393; e.g. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Malawi, at para. 7, U.N. Doc. C/63/CO.12 (Aug. 19, 2003).
153
THORNBERRY, supra note 134, at 393.
147

254

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 48:233

Article 5 is “[t]he right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion . . . .”154
Such an interpretation of Article 5 could be said to impose a freedom from
religious discrimination, at least where it stems from racial discrimination as
defined in Article 1.155 Other included Article 5 rights include freedom of expression156 and of peaceful assembly and association,157 among others.
iii.

Ensuring Compliance: The Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination158

Article 8 of the Racial Discrimination Convention establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, which serves as the Convention’s compliance mechanism.159 Nothing in the Convention compels the
states parties to comply, instead they are required to submit regular reports
that the Committee weighs in on and offers its recommendations.160 As such,
its primary function is to report on the various measures states parties implement in meeting the Convention’s requirements.
Articles 8 and 9 of the Racial Discrimination Convention establish the
committee, detail its composition, and provide its mandate.161 The first paragraph of Article 8 establishes that the committee shall be composed,
of eighteen experts of high moral standing and acknowledged
impartiality elected by States Parties from among their nationals, who shall serve in their personal capacity, consideration
being given to equitable geographical distribution and to the
representation of the different forms of civilization as well as
of the principal legal systems.162
These experts are nominated by states parties and elected by secret ballot163 to serve four year terms.164 The bulk of the Racial Discrimination Committee’s work is composed of examining and issuing recommendations based
on state reports on their progress towards the Convention’s goals.165 Article 9
further empowers the Racial Discrimination Committee to examine state
154
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reports and issue suggestions and general recommendations on which states
parties can issue comments.166
The Racial Discrimination Committee is also empowered to resolve interstate disputes regarding the actions of one state party referred from another
state party. This process begins with an inter-state communication process in
which one state details an allegation that another state party is not in compliance with its obligations under the Racial Discrimination Convention to which
the other state party provides written statements clarifying the matter.167 If this
does not resolve the matter, by any negotiation procedure open to the states
parties, within three months, an independent, ad hoc commission is formed to
seek an appropriate conclusion acceptable to both parties.168 This procedure
has not yet been tested in practice.169
iv.

China’s 2018 Periodic Report to the Racial Discrimination
Committee

China has made a report to the Racial Discrimination Committee as recently as 2017.170 China declined to issue comments on the concluding observations made by the Racial Discrimination Committee, so the relevant items
for analysis are the portions of the state report, the submissions of various
nongovernmental organizations, and the Committee’s concluding observations pertaining to Xinjiang.
China’s 2018 report to the Racial Discrimination Committee makes explicit reference to the Uyghurs and to Xinjiang.171 However, there is no mention of the typical euphemisms used when discussing the internment camps in
the region.172 Instead, Xinjiang is largely discussed in the context of economic
development,173 protection of the Uyghur language,174 or protections of religious exercise.175 These assertions contradict numerous other reports, and
166
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given the Chinese government’s past rhetoric on Xinjiang,176 merit significant
skepticism. China’s report highlights a fundamental problem with information
about Xinjiang: the Chinese government is likely to maintain publicly that its
policies on Xinjiang have brought prosperity and stability to a region once rife
with terrorism, even if such a position is undermined by credible accounts of
human rights abuses in the region.
The Chinese government’s public position was, in fact, publicly disputed
by several non-governmental organizations, many of which included descriptions of Xinjiang’s internment camps.177 Submissions from non-governmental
organizations also included evidence regarding the prohibition of the Uyghur
language,178 systemic violations of China’s criminal procedure law which target Uyghurs,179 and the use of sophisticated mass surveillance techniques.180
These reports and others are in stark contrast to the report filed by China as a
state party, and several allege systemic suppression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.181
The allegations made by non-governmental organizations and others are
given weight in the Racial Discrimination Committee’s concluding observations and recommendations. Taking care to note the Chinese delegation’s
statements the Committee expressed alarm at reports of detention centers182
and similar reports of mass surveillance targeting Uyghurs.183 The Committee
recommended that the Chinese government release those detained in extralegal facilities and allow them opportunity for redress, investigate allegations
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of “ethno-religious profiling,” and provide detailed information on detention
facilities including the content of any political curriculum.184
B. The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights
The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights185 poses affirmative obligations on states parties. Given that the focus
of this Note is not economic discrimination, discussion will be confined to
two fundamental rights violated by the Chinese government’s actions in Xinjiang namely, the right to self-determination and the right to freely take part
in cultural life. Discussion of this agreement will, therefore, not include a
treatment of China’s reservations which do not directly pertain to these rights
and nor affect their application.186 Additionally, this Note will not explore in
any depth China’s most recent periodic report which contains only a limited
discussion on cultural rights as they pertain to the Uyghur language.187 The
right to self-determination is foundational to economic, social and cultural
rights, and these rights can be seen as stemming from this foundational
right.188 Conversely, cultural rights only occupy a small portion of the ESCR
Covenant, and have previously been viewed as something of a lost category.189 Nevertheless, the Article 15 right “to take part in cultural life,”190 can
and should be discussed, particularly considering the international interest in
the protection of minority cultures. In order to understand these rights and
their application, one must consider the relevant background and context on
the ESCR Covenant, which liberties it is meant to protect, and the mechanism
by which it protects them.
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Background to the ESCR Covenant and the Rights Therein

Economic, social and cultural rights can be a difficult area in international
law. These rights have been criticized as non-justiciable and seen merely as
goals to be achieved at some undefined point in the future.191 This is partially
because these rights can be seen as positive liberties stemming from an actual
ability to self-determine as opposed to negative liberties stemming from the
absence of outside impediments to self-determination.192 This distinction has
generated problems for cultural rights enforcement in particular.
Part of the problem is that economic, social and cultural rights are often
seen as being distinct from civil and political rights.193 Moreover, in the past,
some theorists have seen economic, social and cultural rights as coming second behind civil and political rights.194 These rights were severed from an
initial draft of rights that included civil and political rights early on in the
drafting process.195 In part because of this distinction, but despite this setback
and others associated with drafting an agreement, these rights were eventually
adopted into an international agreement in 1966.196 The resulting Covenant
still did not enter into force for another ten years after it was adopted owing
in large part to the belief that while civil and political rights were fundamental
liberties that could enter effect immediately, economic, social and cultural
rights were aspirational and could only be achieved progressively.197
Very little of the ESCR Covenant deals with cultural rights.198 So, in an
international agreement which has been often noted as inherently less justiciable and more aspirational than other international agreements, cultural rights
may appear to be second-class rights even amongst other second-class
rights.199 However, the end of the international tensions surrounding the Cold
War brought renewed appreciation for economic, social, and cultural rights,
and today they receive much the same treatment as to other treaty obligations.200 The rise of multi-culturalist thinking in the new millennium has also
191
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fueled new scholarship on cultural rights; so while cultural rights, particularly
the right of participation in culture, remain under studied, their rise in prominence has given them new weight at the international level.201
ii.

An Emergent Interdependence: Relevant Portions of the ESCR
Covenant

Cultural rights under the ESCR Covenant, including the right to self-determination and cultural development, on their face, pose certain interpretive
problems.202 With regard to the right to self-determination, an issue exists as
to the proper scope of a right that otherwise might be interpreted as encompassing many more freedoms than the ones enumerated in the Covenant itself.
The right to take part in cultural life can appear to beg the question of what
constitutes culture and whether that right functions as an individual or collective right. In order to properly apply these rights, it is therefore necessary to
examine how each of them functions under the ESCR Covenant.
The very first Article of the ESCR Covenant provides: “All peoples have
the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.”203 By the language of the Article, the right to self-determination
serves as the foundation for the other rights provided in the Covenant, and the
word “peoples” indicates that it is a group right, and it has largely been interpreted as such.204 Even as a group right, an expansive definition of self-determination would inherently bring the scope of such a right well beyond the
rights enumerated in the Covenant, and without limitation, may serve as a
right to revolution.205 Such an interpretation would be unacceptable to many
states parties, so it is entirely logical that the right be interpreted as confined
to the scope of the economic, social, and cultural rights in the Covenant.206 To
put it another way, the right to self-determination, while foundational to the
Covenant, is limited in practice to the scope of the other rights contained in
the Covenant.
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The scope of the right to self-determination under Article 1 therefore creates interplay between self-determination and Article 15 which states: “The
States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: (a) To
take part in cultural life . . . .”207 For years the right to cultural participation
resisted interpretation,208 but, in 2009, the Committee on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights issued General Comment 21 clarifying its appropriate
scope and function.209 The resulting interpretation clarified that the right to
take part in cultural life both obligates a state party to abstain from interference and take steps to promote cultural life.210 General Comment 21 further
interprets the right to cultural participation as being applicable to individuals,
associations of individuals, and communities or groups.211 The Committee
also took a very broad approach to the activities falling within the scope of
“cultural life,” including religion, beliefs systems, traditions, and non-verbal
communication.212 Critically, the committee affirmed an interdependence between the right to cultural participation and self-determination.213 An interdependence between self-determination and cultural participation strongly indicates a construction of the right to self-determination as both foundational to
and stemming from the right to cultural participation.
iii.

The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights214 and
its Optional Protocol

The Covenant meant to ensure economic, social, and cultural rights does
not itself create an independent treaty body parallel to the Racial Discrimination Committee. The ESCR Covenant initially required the submission of periodic reports on states parties’ progress under the Covenant to be made to the
Economic and Social Council which, in turn, was empowered to establish a
program to receive them.215 This process led to the creation of Sessional
Working Groups, which were generally regarded as ineffective.216 One of
these working groups eventually suggested that it should be made into a committee of independent experts, and with almost no opposition, the Economic
and Social Council passed a resolution meeting the Working Group’s
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suggestion.217 The end result was a committee which functions and is treated
by states parties as an independent treaty body.218 The ESCR Committee is
composed of elected experts in much the same way as the Racial Discrimination Committee.219 Despite similarities in form and function, the ESCR Committee is not truly independent, as it remains theoretically accountable to the
Economic and Social Council.220
The ESCR Covenant also lacks a process for either inter-state communications or communications from individuals or groups regarding a state
party’s compliance.221 This issue was addressed in the 2008 Optional Protocol
to the ESCR Covenant.222 However, the Committee is still not permitted to
receive such communications regarding states parties to the Covenant if they
are not also parties to the Optional Protocol.223 China is not a party to the
Optional Protocol.224 As a member of the ESCR Covenant but not the Optional Protocol, China is not subject to the Optional Protocol’s communications processes, rendering the Covenant’s periodic report process the sole
mechanism for pressing the Chinese government to meet its obligations.
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C. Chinese Domestic Law 225
The affirmative obligations imposed on states parties to the Racial Discrimination Convention and the ESCR Covenant make an inquiry into domestic
laws critical in evaluating whether a state is in compliance with international
law. In China, several different statutes are relevant to such an inquiry. Any
discussion of Chinese domestic law should begin with an examination into its
Constitution and then turn to other sources, such as domestic laws commonly
cited in discussions of China’s policies as they apply to international agreements. These include: the Criminal Law, the National Security Law, the
Counter-Terrorism Law, and Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification.
i.

Problems with Chinese Constitutional Law

Deciphering the Chinese Constitution to the extent necessary to examine
its precise compliance with, and application to, China’s international obligations highlights an interpretive problem in Chinese law. This problem is aptly
illustrated by Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution which states:
All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China are equal.
The State protects the lawful rights and interests of the minority nationalities and upholds and develops a relationship of
equality, unity, mutual assistance, and harmony among all of
China’s nationalities. Discrimination against and oppression
of any nationality are prohibited; any act which undermines
the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is prohibited.
The State assists areas inhabited by minority nationalities in
accelerating their economic and cultural development

225
Sources of translated Chinese law are limited to Westlaw China which uses official
translations provided by the Chinese Government. Where official translations are unavailable, as is the case with local laws, the Author has used China Law Translate, a website
founded by Jeremy Daum of Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center, which relies on
user driven translations. Translations from China Law Translate are cited in a manner consistent with Mr. Daum’s instructions. Chinese Romanizations necessary for citation have
been proofread by Willy Du, A Chinese Language Teaching Assistant at the University of
Georgia’s Franklin College of Arts and Sciences who has spoken Chinese since an early
age. For an in-depth examination of China’s counterterrorism framework broader in scope
than the one in this note, see Enshen Li, Fighting the “Three Evils”: A Structural Analysis
of Counter-Terrorism Legal Architecture in China, 33 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 311 (2019).
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according to the characteristics and needs of the various minority nationalities.
Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities; in these
areas organs of self-government are established to exercise the
power of autonomy. All national autonomous areas are integral parts of the People’s Republic of China.226
The apparent problem is that very little regarding China’s policies toward
ensuring non-discrimination can be gleaned from a plain reading of the text.
Moreover, the prohibition of discrimination and oppression can easily come
into conflict with punishment of actions that might undermine national unity
or harmony. In its most recent report to the Racial Discrimination Committee,
the Chinese delegation cited Article 4 as evidence of constitutional commitment to the rights of ethnic minorities.227 However, Article 4 was also noted
in Amnesty International’s report to the Racial Discrimination Committee in
the context of highlighting discriminatory wording in the legal framework
cited as evidence of equal treatment.228 To clarify, the problem is not that
China does not have provisions in its Constitution that, at least nominally,
would fulfill some international obligations, but that those provisions which
would do so are often either contradicted, rendered ambiguous, or severely
limited by the language immediately following it.229 Because the Chinese
Constitution is rife with examples of such wording, one must look elsewhere
in order to properly examine how Chinese law interacts with international law.
ii.

Developments in Chinese Criminal Law

China’s criminal law, like much of the country’s law, comes in the form
of a single, regularly amended statute. Article 4 of the Criminal Law reads:
“The law shall be equally applied to anyone who commits a crime. No one
shall have the privilege of transcending the law.”230 This Article establishes
that the provisions in the criminal law shall apply equally to all persons who
226
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commit crimes. Since the criminal law was originally passed in 1997, the National People’s Congress has passed nine amendments to it, with the most recent one entering into force in November 2015.231 Amnesty International
made note of the most recent set of amendments in its report: “These offences
are open to subjective interpretation, violating the legality requirement for
criminal offences, and increasing the possibility of abusive, arbitrary and discriminatory prosecution and conviction.”232 The amended Criminal Law included Article 120c, which states:
Whoever propagates terrorism or extremism by way of preparing or distributing books, audio and video materials or other
items that propagate terrorism or extremism or by way of
teaching or releasing information, etc. or instigates the terrorist
activities shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not
more than five years, criminal detention, public surveillance
or deprivation of political rights and concurrently sentenced to
a fine. If the circumstances are serious, the person shall be sentenced to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than five years
and concurrently sentenced to a fine or confiscation of property.233
More concisely put, Article 120c criminalizes the distribution of any media
that propagates terrorism or extremism, and sets out punishments for doing
so.234 120c and several other Articles in the 2015 amendments impose criminal sentences for activity that is said to spread extremism, but fail to provide
a definition for either terrorism or extremism.235 The Racial Discrimination
Committee voiced concern in its closing observations on China regarding
broad and vague language in Chinese laws,236 and recommended China review its existing laws to ensure that these terms are defined narrowly and the
existence of safeguards against abuse.237
iii.

China’s Counter-Terrorism Framework

Relevant Chinese law on counter-terrorism contrasts with the Criminal
Law in that it does not come in the form of a single piece of legislation, but
from a framework of interconnected, sometimes overlapping laws functioning
231
232
233
234
235
236
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at both the national and local levels.238 This network of laws does include a
specific law dedicated to counter-terrorism, the Anti-Terrorism Law of the
People’s Republic of China, which creates a policy called “placement and education” that allows for the indefinite detention of criminals who have been
convicted of crimes relating to extremism with some limitations.239 The AntiTerrorism Law also creates a mechanism by which someone who has committed a lesser offense of extremism (which can mean as little as possessing
an illegal book)240 may be detained for up to fifteen days without having technically committed a crime.241 Local regulations enacted pursuant to the AntiTerrorism Law have imposed specific laws targeting Islamic practices including: burqas,242 irregular name selection,243 and any other speech or acts seen
to be promoting radicalization.244 Still, the most integral provision comes in
Article 2 of the National Security Law:
National security shall refer to the status whereby the State’s
political regime, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the
welfare of its people, its sustainable economic and social development, and other material national interests are relatively
free from danger and international and domestic threats, and
the ability to ensure the continuous status of security.245
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By this Article, Chinese law has, at least to an extent, defined national
security in terms of the extent to which the political regime of the Chinese
Communist Party is free from domestic threats to its sovereignty over a unified China.246
IV. SUPPRESSED IN XINJIANG
It may be tempting, considering the facts, to take a brief look at the Chinese
government’s campaign against the Uyghurs, briefly examine the international agreements to which China is a party, and quickly conclude that the
Chinese government is failing to meet its obligations because, in many ways,
if the Racial Discrimination Convention and the ESCR Covenant prohibit anything, they certainly prohibit mass surveillance, arrest, and internment of an
ethnic and cultural minority. Nevertheless, a systematic violation of this magnitude warrants an inquiry beyond the text of the international agreements
themselves, and a further inquiry as to how Chinese law contributes to racial
and ethnic oppression.
A. A Right to Be Free from Surveillance?
Though the Xinjiang surveillance apparatus is unquestionably the least
forceful aspect of the Chinese government’s campaign against the Uyghurs, it
is still discriminatory in a manner prohibited by the Racial Discrimination
Convention and still violates the cultural rights guaranteed in the ESCR Covenant. These violations are compounded by the fact that Chinese law contributes to these violations and are made no less important by the absence of overt
physical force from the surveillance campaign.
i.

Xinjiang’s Surveillance System as a Violation of the Racial
Discrimination Convention

Discussion of the Racial Discrimination Convention thus far has elaborated on two key concepts: the right to be free from racial discrimination and
the conception of the enumerated rights in Article 5 not as a right to equality
in their exercise, but as part of a broader framework necessary to eliminate
racial discrimination under Article 1.247
Examining the Xinjiang surveillance systems, which combines a massive
police presence with sophisticated technology, in light of Article 1’s expansive definition of racial discrimination and Article 2’s iteration of the right to
be free from racial discrimination, it is clear that the use of a mass surveillance
246
247
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system, which targets Uyghurs on the basis of their ethnic origin, constitutes
a violation of the right to be free from racial discrimination.248 This is particularly apparent in the home visitation system which specifically targets Uyghur families for additional at-home monitoring.249 The program the government calls adoption is quite obviously an act of racial discrimination within
the scope of Article 2.250
The government’s use of mass surveillance violates Article 5 in much the
same way. Conceived of as part of a necessary framework for eliminating racial discrimination, the Article 5 rights, most notably the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, and religion, function as a right to equal protection from
religious discrimination when religious discrimination stems from racial discrimination as defined by Article 1.251 Given that the Uyghurs can be seen as
an ethno-religious minority group,252 religious discrimination against them
fits within this framework, and is a violation of Article 5. Moreover, the existence of a surveillance system intended as a method of round-the-clock monitoring can be a barrier to the freedom of conscious that Article 5 is meant to
protect. The general profiling of Muslims by Xinjiang’s government by requiring them to fill out forms regarding frequency of religious practice, among
other things,253 therefore breaches this framework.
ii.

Xinjiang’s Surveillance System as a Violation of the ESCR
Covenant

Given the interconnectedness of the right to self-determination and the
right to participation in cultural life, cultural rights as envisioned in General
Comment 21 are best applied as two parts of the same whole.254 General Comment 21 takes a very broad interpretation of the cultural rights in the ESCR
Covenant.255 Critically, the Comment interprets the Convention as embodying
an obligation to ensure preconditions for participating in cultural life.256 The
Comment, in turn, interprets cultural life to encompass a broad range of social
behaviors and activities.257 Given that the surveillance state functions to ensure the exact opposite of Uyghur cultural participation, the surveillance state
can and should be seen as a violation of cultural rights.
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Applying Chinese Domestic Law

The surveillance state actively violates rights outlined in the Racial Discrimination Convention and the ESCR Covenant.258 That being said, of all
three aspects of the campaign, mass surveillance is the least controversial under Chinese law. Given the nature and makeup of Chinese legal and political
system, the use and creation of a surveillance apparatus the size of the one in
Xinjiang will not require much justification domestically, nor will justifying
its existence on grounds of a terrorist threat from the Uyghurs. Moreover, because of the preoccupation with the more fundamentally discriminatory and
overtly brutal aspects of the other phases of the campaign against the Uyghurs,
it is unsurprising that the surveillance system, while mentioned briefly,259 has
not been the center of the committees’, or the international community’s, attention.260 Nevertheless, it should be troubling that in a nation with a stated
commitment to equal treatment under the law, a discriminatory surveillance
apparatus has been allowed to do its work.
B. Strike Hard Under International Law
In the second phase of the campaign against the Uyghurs, the Strike Hard
campaign, any pretense of potential legality under international law should
begin to fall by the wayside. Strike Hard is historically a discriminatory tactic
devoted largely to the suppression of cultural dissidents.261 It is clearly illegal
under both the international agreements and the integral rights implicated in
Xinjiang.

i.

Strike Hard Analyzed under the Racial Discrimination Convention

The core premise and motivating force behind Strike Hard is the elimination of dissidents, and the Uyghurs, who have been motivated by religious
ideas and the distant memory of self-rule,262 are its natural targets. As such,
measuring Strike Hard under the Racial Discrimination Convention does not
258
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require much analysis. Article 1 poses a wide definition of racial discrimination and Article 2 poses an interconnected fabric of human rights that serve as
the framework for compliance with the Convention.263 Strike Hard involves
conducting raids on the homes of a members of repressed ethnic group because of their belonging to that group and burning their cultural possessions,264 so strike hard does not comply with China’s obligations under the
Racial Discrimination Convention.
It is a titanic understatement to claim that Strike Hard violates the Racial
Discrimination Convention. Campaigns like strike hard are antithetical to the
principles that undergird the Racial Discrimination Convention and international law generally. The Racial Discrimination Convention is premised on
the idea that racial minorities should not have to suffer the indignity of unequal treatment, much less overt persecution.265 That China has breached its
obligations so wantonly is further evidence that it does not take them seriously.
ii.

Strike Hard Under the ESCR Covenant

The positive nature of the interconnected cultural rights at issue in this
Note renders them effectively incapable of being met in a situation in which
strike hard tactics are employed. Strike hard is fundamentally aggressive and
rooted partially in prejudice. As such, it is largely antithetical to the very idea
of the sort of positive liberties laid out in the ESCR Covenant.
If a nation is responsible for ensuring the preconditions necessary for all
ethnic groups, communities, and individuals to pursue their own cultural fulfillment, then that nation cannot be knocking down their doors and burning
culturally important materials.266 The brazen nature of the Strike Hard campaign further demonstrates the Chinese government’s lack of proper regard
for international agreements and norms. Even as China has continued this
campaign, it has publicly claimed that, “special attention is paid to their economic development and to their enjoyment of cultural and employment
rights.”267 It is hardly an exaggeration to say that such a statement is entirely
contrary to reality in Xinjiang. In light of the strike hard campaign, it is more
accurate to say that the complete opposite is true.
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Strike Hard and Chinese Law

Analyzing the Strike Hard campaign under the Racial Discrimination Convention and the ESCR Covenant is an insufficient method of analysis. Under
either doctrine, the tactics used by strike hard are simply incompatible. Turning then to Chinese law, the question quickly becomes how it might be possible under the Chinese Constitution that such policies which specifically target
Uyghurs,268 as an ethno-religious group, comport with Article 4 of the Chinese
Constitution.269 This represents a disturbing trend in Chinese law as it pertains
to Xinjiang. The Chinese government is effectively ignoring portions of its
law in favor of other areas of the law that are more friendly to its policy objectives.
More specifically, the provisions in Chinese Law that supposedly protect
the civil liberties of Chinese citizens have given way to provisions in its recently amended criminal law as well as the various counter-terrorism statutes.270 The 2015 Amendments to the Criminal Law criminalize numerous
activities related to “extremism.”271 However, given the Chinese government’s almost flagrantly pretextual use of a terrorist threat in Xinjiang to justify a massive campaign against Uyghur culture, any assertion that these laws
are meant to do anything besides provide legal cover for the persecution of
politically thorny ethnic minorities should strain credulity. It would be far
more accurate to argue that these laws actually contribute to religious persecution in China. By criminalizing behavior associated with extremism, these
laws effectively amount to a blank check to persecute religious minorities and
associated dissidents. There is perhaps no greater example of this than the
Xinjiang Regulation on De-Extremification, which all but expressly targets
Uyghur culture,272 and is drafted on the basis of the Anti-Terrorism Law.273
C. The Xinjiang Internment Camps
Turning to the Xinjiang internment camps, using the canons of interpretation focused on thus far in this Note, it is clear that Xinjiang’s internment
camps depart significantly enough from the obligations in both the Racial Discrimination Convention or the ESCR Covenant to warrant focusing largely on
268

Chin & Bürge, supra note 86.
XIANFA art. 4, §1 (2018).
270
Compare, e.g., XIANFA art. 36 (2018) (supposedly preserving freedom of religion),
with Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 230, at art. 120e (criminalizing dresses or symbols that propagate terrorism or extremism).
271
Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, supra note 230, at arts. 120c, 120d,
120e.
272
Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Regulation on De-Extremification, supra note
238, at art. 9.
273
Id. at art. 1.
269

2019]

SILENCING XINJIANG

271

Chinese domestic law, particularly China’s stated justification under Chinese
law, namely, fighting off a terrorist threat.274
As far as international law is concerned, the behavior of the Chinese government in Xinjiang is not merely unlawful under the Racial Discrimination
Convention or the ESCR Covenant; it runs contrary to the core premises and
rationale of international law as a whole. This is because, once again, if these
agreements are to mean anything at all, they must mean that it is unacceptable
for a national government to engage in vigorous persecution of an ethnic minority, or to otherwise oppress their culture for the purposes of forced assimilation.
That being the case, it would be too easy to simply reach such an obvious
conclusion without digging deeper. Chinese domestic law, while at least nominally offering protection to ethnic minorities,275 is clearly not doing so. The
nature and structure of Chinese law can shed some light on this quandary.
China’s definition of national security, for instance, has a considerable
amount of explanatory power in this regard. The National Security Law articulates protection of the state’s political regime, unified territorial integrity,
and the leadership of the Communist Party as three of its primary prerogatives
in ensuring national security.276 Such a position poses a problem in Xinjiang,
where many Uyghurs have historically sought self-determination even as the
Chinese government reasserts its commitment to maintaining its territorial integrity and sovereignty.277
China’s definition of national security therefore renders some sort of conflict with the Uyghurs inevitable. As discussed previously, the Uyghur people
are culturally, linguistically, and historically distinct from other nationalities
in China,278 and given the rhetoric of the Xi administration,279 it may be unsurprising to see that the Chinese government has, in light of previous violent
altercations with Uyghur nationalists and separatists, sought to reassert control over the region.280 In doing so, it has shrouded its actions in a veneer of
legality under its counter-terrorism framework. While not expressly authorizing anything resembling the creation of mass internment camps, the Anti-Terrorism Law poses a framework that allows for even persons who have engaged
in what it classifies as “extremist activities” that do not rise to the level of
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criminal behavior to receive help and education.281 Local regulations in Xinjiang are similarly euphemistic, if not more explicitly anti-Islam and anti-Uyghur.282
None of this is to say that the Chinese government has legalized these
camps, or that they are mandated by law.283 Rather, the nature and structure
of Chinese government at the national and local level render the need for specific legal authorization largely irrelevant because in the People’s Republic,
the state and political regime control the law as opposed to being controlled
by the law.284 This system renders Messrs. Xi and Chen unbound by any legal
framework that might foreseeably force them to end the campaign.
V. CONCLUSION
The situation in Xinjiang tends to call to mind dystopian images and bleak
skies. This might be a fair appraisal if one examined only the facts. In examining the situation internationally, there is some solace to be taken in understanding the rights nations obligate themselves to under international agreements do not allow someone to be imprisoned for indoctrination. Conversely,
there is little reason to believe that international legal frameworks will restrain
the Chinese government going forward. Chinese domestic law offers little
hope of salvation for Xinjiang. As new, horrific allegations285 seep forward
from Xinjiang’s re-education camps, it seems more international awareness
may be coming even as the clocks have already struck thirteen in Urumqi.
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